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Israel’s recent plan to annex parts of the West Bank threatens the stability 
of Jordan along with the Palestinian territories and Israel itself. To under-
stand the repercussions of annexation, we must examine the positions of the 
relevant actors and their potential responses to the Israeli plan. Three con-
stellations of actors can be singled out: de facto accepters, weak  opposers, 
and militant revisionists.
 • Despite the Gulf states’ and Egypt’s condemnation of the annexation plan, they 
will not take concrete measures to thwart it, due to their evolving relations with 
Israel and their reliance on the United States. This de facto acceptance by Egypt 
and the Gulf states weakens the position of the Kingdom of Jordan and the Pal-
estinian Authority (PA) in advocating against the proposed plan.
 • The prospective annexation will directly and negatively impact the Kingdom of 
Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. However, because of 
their own internal challenges, the absence of regional Arab support, and their 
dependence on Israel and the United States on different issues, Jordan and the 
PA lack the capacity to offset the Israeli plan. 
 • The Islamist militant factions in the Palestinian territories oppose the annexa-
tion plan and seem capable of turning their escalatory rhetoric against Israel 
into violent action. The probability of this happening might increase if the Pal-
estinian Authority collapses in the West Bank.
Policy Implications
The annexation plan runs counter to the EU’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Israeli–
Palestinian peace process. The EU should work collectively to dissuade Israel 
from implementing the annexation plan by applying diplomatic and, if neces-
sary, economic pressure. Additionally, the EU should support Jordan’s anti-
annexation diplomatic campaign. The Palestinian Authority should receive the 
EU’s political and financial backing as long as the PA commits to comprehensive 
reforms.
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on 28 May 2020 Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his com-
mitment to annexing 30 per cent of the West Bank as of 1 July, a proposal met by in-
ternational and regional condemnation, to say nothing of Palestinian denunciation. 
The date set was later pushed back without another date being named. Although 
the fallout from implementing the annexation plan is hard to forecast precisely, 
intra-Palestinian dynamics and regional complexity should not be underestimated 
as factors that may lead to another violent escalation and heightened instability in 
Israeli–Palestinian relations.
Mapping the various actors relevant to the potential annexation and their 
 stances on it is crucial to highlighting the potential sources of instability should 
 Israel proceed with the scheme. In this vein, three constellations of actors  can be 
singled out: de facto accepters, states that seem not to prioritise the  Palestinian 
cause on their agendas with Israel and hence will not undertake substantial moves 
to prevent the prospective annexation; weak opposers, actors that oppose the 
 Israeli plan and will be directly affected by it, yet have no realistic tools to thwart 
it; and militant revisionists, non-state Islamist armed groups whose strategic depth 
derives from the support of regional powers and who stand against annexation and 
may resort to violence to offset it. 
De Facto Accepters: The Gulf Arab States and Egypt
With regard to their rhetoric, it should be emphasised that the position of the Gulf 
Arab states and Egypt is similar to that of the UN, EU, and the other Arab states in 
criticising the plan to annex and calling on Israel to abide by the rules of interna-
tional law. However, an observation of the evolving cooperation between the Gulf 
Arab states, Egypt, and Israel reveals deeper relationships and coordination in a 
multitude of fields and strategic postures. For example, the Kingdom of Saudi  Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates share the Israeli perception that Iran is a major 
threat in the region (Beck 2019), especially given its remarkable expansion in Syria, 
Yemen, Iraq, and lebanon, and its proxy, cyber, nuclear, and missile programmes. 
Additional factors indicate the Gulf Arab states’ desire to “normalise” relations 
with Israel; take, for example, the frequent meetings between Israeli and Gulf state 
officials, including Netanyahu’s visit to Muscat in 2018, the Israeli foreign minister’s 
meeting with his Bahraini counterpart in Washington in 2019, and Netanyahu’s 
meeting with senior Arab officials at the Warsaw Summit, organised by the United 
States in 2019. Further, an Israeli pavilion is currently under construction in Dubai, 
which is preparing to host the postponed Expo 2020 in 2021 and to potentially 
allow Israeli passport holders to enter Dubai on those passports. Qatar is also con-
sidering granting a similar permission to enable Israeli citizens to attend the pro-
spective FIFA World cup 2022 in Qatar (Ferziger and Bahgat 2020). cooperation 
in the medical realm is also underway –  in particular in regard to the coVID-19 
pandemic, whereby three member states of the Gulf cooperation council (Gcc), 
including Bahrain, contacted Israeli medical centres for assistance and informa-
tion on the virus (Harkov 2020). Also, Israeli technology is in demand among the 
Gulf Arab states, especially in fields such as cyber-spying, desert agriculture, and 
desalination.
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As regards Egypt, a phone call between presidents Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Egypt) 
and Mahmoud Abbas (Palestinian Authority) took place on 20 July 2020 and was 
followed by a visit of the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukri, to Ramallah 
on 21 July. El-Sisi and Shoukri both reiterated Egypt’s support for the rights of 
the Palestinian people and its opposition to the Israeli unilateral plan. Neverthe-
less, countering the annexation plan seems for various reasons to not be an Egyp-
tian priority. First, Egypt is facing the spread of coVID-19, which has damaged its 
economy mainly because remittances from the Gcc countries have been curtailed 
and tourism suspended. Second, Ethiopia’s so-called “Grand Renaissance Dam” sits 
atop cairo’s agenda, as continuous negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia have 
been ongoing for almost a decade without having yielded tangible results. As Egypt 
hinges on US support vis-à-vis the dam negotiations, it is not predisposed to dis-
appoint the administration of President Donald Trump over the annexation plan, 
especially given that the Trump “Peace to Prosperity” plan for the Middle East has 
further emboldened Netanyahu to call for annexation. Third, the unfolding clashes 
in libya have complicated the Egyptian situation and the prospects for Egypt’s sup-
port for Khalifa Haftar against the UN-recognised Government of National Accord 
(GNA) in libya. Here, too, Egypt looks to the United States to curb the Turkish 
intrusion. Fourth, Egyptian–Israeli relations are flourishing and multifaceted to the 
extent that Egypt coordinates with Israel in combatting the Islamist insurgency in 
the Sinai Peninsula; imports gas from Israel and was one of the signatories to the 
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (along with Israel and other regional countries); 
and relied on Israel in 2013 to undo the US suspension of USD 1.3 billion aid to 
Egypt. Finally, cairo’s relations with its Palestinian neighbours are not optimal, in 
particular with Hamas, which holds power in the Gaza Strip and is viewed by Egypt 
as an affiliate of the Muslim Brothers, the fierce enemies of President el-Sisi (Boxer-
man 2020). In short, Egypt is overwhelmed by an array of imminent domestic and 
regional challenges, and it is highly improbable that it would risk its strong ties with 
the United States and Israel to work effectively against the annexation plan.
Weak Opposers: Jordan and the Palestinian Authority
In Jordan, top-ranking officials such as the prime minister and the minister of for-
eign affairs publicly condemned the Israeli plan and warned against its implemen-
tation. Further, King Abdullah II asserted in an interview with Der Spiegel in May 
2020, “If Israel really annexes the West Bank in July, it would lead to a massive 
conflict with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” and hinted that all options are 
conceivable, including reconsidering its 1994 peace treaty with Israel (Der Spiegel 
2020). Despite the ambiguity in the potential Jordanian response to the next Israeli 
move, Jordan will be directly impacted if Israel fulfils its intention and annexes 
parts of the West Bank: Jordan already hosts more than two million registered Pal-
estinian refugees and will be further pressured demographically, economically, and 
in security terms should the annexation transpire, which may lead to the forced mi-
gration of more Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. In addition, the Israeli 
plan could also jeopardise the Hashemite regime’s status as the custodian of the 
holy Muslim shrines in Jerusalem as recognised by Article 9 of the Israeli–Jorda-
nian peace treaty. 
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Although Jordan will be threatened if the annexation materialises, it is highly 
improbable that the country could avert it: The already strained Jordanian  economy 
is a perpetual beneficiary of US aid and financial support. Furthermore, Jordan 
signed a USD 10 billion gas import deal with Israel in 2016, which is set to last for 
15 years and is expected to guarantee stable energy prices for Jordan, saving the 
kingdom up to USD 500 million per annum, thus reducing the perennial budget 
deficit. The interdependence between Israel and Jordan is, likewise, profound in 
terms of security, military, and intelligence cooperation in counterterrorism and 
against smuggling, and has proven rather immune to political fluctuations (Riedel 
2020). Hence, it is hard to imagine how Jordan will manage those interconnected 
issues if it takes concrete steps towards abrogating the 1994 peace treaty. Further, 
although the 1994 peace treaty with Israel is unpopular on the streets of Jordan, 
it represents the legal framework that organises the relationship between the two 
countries, including Jordan’s access to water, transportation, access to ports, civil 
aviation, tourism, and so on, which makes revoking it without clear alternatives 
more of a leap into the darkness rather than a prudent choice. Finally, Jordan’s 
warnings lack regional endorsement from its Gulf allies and diverge from the US 
prioritisation of Israeli interests. In short, the stakes for Jordan are too high if it 
abrogates the peace treaty and it seems unrealistic that it could afford this option. 
However, the kingdom will heavily invest in all peaceful means available to prevent 
annexation. 
After the announcement of the creation of the Netanyahu–Gantz unity govern-
ment, which is officially considering the annexation of parts of the West Bank, Pres-
ident Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority (PA) which rules over ar-
eas of the West Bank, unilaterally declared on 19 May that all previous agreements, 
understandings, and commitments between the PA and the Israeli and American 
governments, including security agreements, would be ended. This has not (yet) 
come to fruition, and it is noteworthy that Abbas has made similar announcements 
on different previous occasions without seeing them through. 
Notwithstanding the true intention of Abbas, the PA’s dilemma is two-pronged: 
First, the extent to which the PA is dependent on Israel in terms of security, eco-
nomics, governance, and administration makes it too weak in its current status to 
prevent the annexation should it go forward. Second, if the PA disengages from all 
its agreements with Israel, this would mean a dismantling of the oslo Accords, the 
very agreement upon which the PA was established, thus an abandonment of the 
structures of its ruling capacity. This second scenario could be tantamount to the 
collapse of the PA and may create a vacuum that can realistically be filled only by 
Hamas (Melman 2020), hence increasing the chances for violence. Put differently, 
the PA might prove a disruptive actor not because of its proactive ability to clash 
with Israel upon its planned annexation; rather, the PA’s disruptive potential stems 
from its very collapse.
To be sure, the disintegration of the PA can result from factors other than cut-
ting its ties with Israel. To illustrate, a set of drawbacks characterise the representa-
tiveness and performance of the PA, such as the blurred institutional boundaries 
between the PA and Palestinian liberation organisation (Plo); the suspension of 
the Palestinian legislative council’s elections since 2006; the persistence of the 
geographical and administrative split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
since 2007 without a constructive dialogue having been embarked on by the PA 
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that would include the other Palestinian factions with whom it has feuded and pave 
the way for a national reconciliation; and the ageing political leadership that is re-
luctant to open space for the participation of younger generations (Rahman 2019). 
These realities, among other things, have led to a dwindling legitimacy of the PA 
and in particular of President Abbas in recent years, which suggests that the PA 
is already fragile and may not withstand the annexation if it comes into force. The 
beneficiaries of the PA’s precariousness would be the Palestinian factions that enjoy 
higher levels of acceptance among the Palestinian people and have non-trivial insti-
tutional networks in the West Bank, primarily Hamas.   
Militant Revisionists: Hamas and the Islamic Jihad
The Islamic Resistance Movement (known as Hamas) and the Islamic Jihad Move-
ment in Palestine (PIJ) are two Palestinian Sunni-Islamist organisations that  govern 
the Gaza Strip. Along with their respective militant wings, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades and Al-Quds Brigades, they played pivotal roles in mobilising the so-called 
Second Intifada that erupted against Israel and lasted between 2000 and 2005. 
Hamas and the PIJ follow similar ideological lines vis-à-vis the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict, rejecting the two-state solution, aiming to liberate the entirety of the oc-
cupied Palestinian territories, and not recognising the State of Israel. To be sure, 
Hezbollah of lebanon can be conceptually added to this constellation. However, it 
is unlikely that Hezbollah will be directly involved in any violent escalation between 
the Palestinian Islamist factions and Israel due to its exhaustive combat operations 
in Syria, the increased international sanctions against it, and the economic and so-
cio-political hardships that lebanon is facing.
According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Iran has been pro-
viding the militant factions in the Palestinian territories with financial,  operational, 
and military supplies since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979 (MFA 
2003) – a fact not denied by Hamas or the PIJ. With Trump’s “Peace to  Prosperity” 
plan in January 2020 and the official endorsement of the annexation plan by the 
newly formed Israeli coalition government, the Islamist factions in the Gaza Strip 
adopted a stronger tone of rejection towards both plans. In this regard, the spokes-
person of the Al-Quds Brigades called on Palestinians to attack Israeli military 
checkpoints (Memo 2020). Also, the spokesperson for the Al-Qassam Brigades 
 stated that Israel’s plan is a “declaration of war against the Palestinian people” 
(Asharq Al-Awsat 2020), whereas his Hamas counterpart emphasised that “resist-
ance” is the best strategic option for the Palestinians to thwart the annexation. 
Beyond their escalatory rhetoric, Hamas and the PIJ have also been consolidat-
ing their regional ties and domestic tactics in recent years to bypass the siege imposed 
on the Gaza Strip since 2007. Politically, the leaderships of the PIJ and  Hamas have 
been making noticeable efforts to restore their relations with the  Iranian and Syrian 
leaderships following the deterioration in relations caused by the refusal of the PIJ 
and Hamas to side with the Syrian leadership in the Syrian war. Since 2012, Hamas 
and the PIJ have abandoned their offices in Damascus and moved to  Qatar, with Iran 
suspending its financial support to them. Today, those ties seem to be flourishing 
again, with the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Ismail  Haniyeh, receiving a message 
from the Iranian supreme leader, Ali  Khamenei, which  assured Iranian support for 
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the Palestinian people against annexation. Similarly,  Haniyeh and the secretary-gen-
eral of the PIJ were contacted on 1 July by the Iranian Shura council spokesperson 
to review the potential mechanisms for countering  annexation. 
Hamas has also been attempting to improve its relations with Jordan since 
2019, when Haniyeh and other Hamas officials reiterated their support for  Jordan 
and asserted their appreciation of the king’s stance on the annexation plan.  Whether 
the rapprochement between Hamas and Jordan is forthcoming is not yet clear; nev-
ertheless, the kingdom may face obstacles on this issue given the US classification 
of Hamas as a terrorist organisation and the potential sensitivity of the PA to such 
a rapprochement. 
Maybe the least expected of all was the conciliatory meeting between long-time 
rivals Hamas and Fatah (formerly known as the Palestinian National liberation 
Movement), the historic predecessor of the PA. The two prominent factions agreed 
to join forces to forestall the annexation plan that threatens the future of the na-
tional Palestinian project and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.  
In the economic realm, the Gaza Strip, including Hamas and the PIJ, has been 
under a chronic blockade from Israel, the PA, and Egypt on items as vital as goods, 
energy, access to ports, money flows, and so on, which has rendered the PIJ and 
 Hamas more dependent on Iran. However, after 2012 the Iranian financial lifeline 
was allegedly cut, which synchronised with the two factions’ move from Syria to 
Qatar and their subsequent dependence on Qatari aid. Nevertheless, the Qatari 
financial backing came, according to a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau, with 
stipulations on the behaviour of Hamas and in favour of non-escalation with Israel 
(Abu Aisha 2019). Today, with the improvement between Hamas, the PIJ, and Iran, 
the two factions seem more confident that their finances will be buttressed by Iran 
again, whose support comes unencumbered by prerequisites. of course, pinpoint-
ing the networks that Iran used, and will use, to transfer money into the Gaza Strip 
is exceedingly difficult.
A new path that Hamas is treading to raise funds is bitcoin: the Al-Qassam 
Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, is experimenting with a cryptocurrency-based 
funding campaign and has issued a two-minute video on its website that explains 
in detail how its supporters can donate bitcoin (alqassam.net). A report by Reuters 
contends that what makes this mechanism hard to trace is the creation of a new dig-
ital wallet with each transaction (Wilson and Williams 2019). The point here is not 
mainly the amount of funds that Hamas will be garnering from this new method; 
rather, it is the endeavour to cope with the blockade and to escape the traditional, 
years-old measures of financial scrutiny by the Israeli authorities.
The persistent besiegement of the Gaza Strip has not only crippled the  economic 
and financial resources of the PIJ and Hamas, it has also curtailed their military 
outsources. A big blow in this regard was the closure in 2013 by President El-Sisi 
of the tunnels underneath the Egypt–Gaza border, which deprived Hamas and the 
PIJ of smuggled weapons and goods and the ensuing tax income. In spite of that, 
the building up of forces within the blockaded Gaza does not seem to have ebbed 
dramatically. one demonstration of the PIJ’s ability to pose a threat to the Israeli 
territories took place in 2019 when the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) assassinated the 
commander of the Al-Quds Brigades in the northern Gaza Strip. The PIJ responded 
to this operation by launching 450 rockets at Israel. The IDF combat engagement 
focused primarily on targeting the PIJ’s launch units and the corresponding  storage 
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and manufacturing infrastructures. The confrontation was relatively short and 
 ended with a ceasefire agreement (Dekel 2019). 
In the same vein, Hamas has also developed an arsenal with effective and ad-
vanced weaponry (self-made and previously smuggled), which includes shoulder-
launched anti-aircraft missiles, guided anti-tank missiles, and an array of rockets 
with improved ranges and a network of attack and defence tunnels under the Gaza–
Israel fence, allegedly in addition to a preliminary drones programme (Akram 
2019). In short, Hamas and the PIJ have worked towards circumventing the im-
posed siege on Gaza, continuing to develop their arsenals, networks, and tactics. 
To sum up, amongst the three delineated constellations of actors relevant to 
the West Bank annexation plan, Hamas and the PIJ appear as the only players who 
can substantiate their escalatory rhetoric via resorting to violence. Both organisa-
tions have been investing in improving their regional political ties, economic sur-
vival modes, and military resilience under suffocating blockade conditions. Their 
dependence also hinges primarily on Iran, a major foe of Israel that might have an 
interest in enmeshing Israel in a domestic battle to distract it from systematically 
targeting itself and Hezbollah in Syria. To put it differently, the PIJ and Hamas, un-
like the Gulf countries, Egypt, Jordan, and the PA, will not lose US endorsement or 
sacrifice their multifaceted ties with Israel should they make good on their threats to 
Israel and its annexation plan. Also, the record of Hamas–IDF and PIJ–IDF armed 
confrontations shows that Hamas and the PIJ do not usually prefer negotiations.
Options for the European Union
If implemented, the annexation plan will pose a strategic threat to Jordan and its 
stability. It will also mean the end of decades of peace negotiations between Israel 
and the PA and the termination of the two-state solution and the oslo Accords. This, 
in turn, will lead to heightened radicalisation among the militant Islamist groups 
(mainly Hamas and the PIJ) in the Palestinian territories and may instigate new 
episodes of violence and destruction. To prevent this gloomy fate, the EU should 
follow a bifurcated policy. First, in terms of Israel, the EU must arrive at a unani-
mous agreement to push Israel diplomatically in order to convince it of the prob-
able negative repercussions of annexation. To this end, the EU should also consider 
imposing economic sanctions on Israel should it proceed with its plan. Second, in 
terms of Jordan and the PA, it is worth remembering that they are the moderate 
actors with whom Israel has been dealing for decades on Palestinian–Israeli issues. 
Thus, the political and diplomatic position of Jordan should be buttressed by the 
EU both on the international level and vis-à-vis Israel.
In regard to the PA, it is imperative that the PA continue to act as the repre-
sentative of the Palestinians before the international community and as the gov-
erning authority in the West Bank. However, the PA’s survival should be coupled 
with a comprehensive reform of its political and operative structures to guarantee 
that a national dialogue is initiated that includes all the Palestinian factions and 
aims to end the political and geographic separation between the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. These reforms should also include holding elections for a new legisla-
tive council; clarifying the institutional boundaries of the Plo and the PA; opening 
the PA for broader membership of actors from outside Fatah; and paving the way 
for younger generations to replace the already aged leadership.
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